Different schools have answered this question differently.
Classical economists argued that the key variable to exchange rate regimes is transactions costs.
Because these transactions costs represent social losses, they should be minimized and the way to do it is to have a single worldwide currency. Thus the entire world is an optimum currency area. J.
S. Mill puts it in a very illustrative way:
"...So much of barbarism, however, still remains in the transactions of most civilized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbors, a peculiar currency of their own."3 Of course, in order to explain the existence of different currencies Mill had to claim a kind of "barbarism", a view that is not shared by many of his XXth century followers. The New Classical economists claim that one has to weigh the costs of having heterogeneous currencies with the benefits of being of each country being able to achieve its own optimal rate of money growth. Because they view the process of money supply as essentially a tax on existing money holdings, they see no reason why money growth (or inflation) should not be viewed within the problem of optimal taxation for each country.
Hence, they explain the existence of different currencies according to structural differences across countries that lead to different optimal tax rates.
For instance, it has been argued that the private technology for evading income taxes in Italy is superior to the one in Germany so the optimal inflation tax in Italy may be larger than in Germany.
Thus the two countries should enjoy different currencies.
See for instance Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) .
Another view, associated with Monetarist and Keynesian economists puts the money supply process (and therefore the exchange rate regime) in the context of stabilization policies. Mundell (1961) argued that only regions within which there is relatively high labor mobility should have a unique currency4. His (now canonical) example is the following:
suppose we have two regions (A and B), each producing one good (a and b respectively) and populated by households who consume a little bit of both goods so that there is interregional trade.
Suppose that, starting from a full employment equilibrium position, there is a permanent shift of preferences from good a to good b (ie, at initial relative prices, everybody prefers relatively more of good b and less a). If the relative price between the two goods (the real ER) does not change, there will be a trade imbalance (a deficit for A and a surplus for B). Equilibrium can be restored at the initial relative price by changing the supplied quantities of both a and b. This can be achieved by moving people from region A to region B.
Yet another way to restore equilibrium is by changing the relative price and maintaining the initial quantities. In turn, this can be done through two different channels: the first one involves changing the nominal exchange rate and leaving the nominal prices in the two regions unchanged.
This possibility is not present, however, when both regions have the same currency.
The second way of moving the real ER is to change the nominal prices levels. In the case we are considering, the price level in A has to go down relative to the one in B.
If prices and wages adjust immediately, the real ER jumps to the new equilibrium level and that is the end of the story. But the economists that support these stories believe that price levels are "sticky" (possibly due to small menu costs). In this case, the new equilibrium real ER will slowly be reached but only after a period of "over employment" in B and deflation and unemployment in A5. The longer it takes the nominal prices to adjust, the more severe will be the recession in It has been argued that one of the reasons why the U.S. exchange rate system has held up reasonably well is the existence of a "Federal Fiscal
Authority" which insures states against regional shocks9. In addition to the mechanisms already mentioned (devaluation, labor movements or recession),
there is another way of maintaining a fixed parity without major real imbalances: having a redistribution of income from "adversely shocked" to "favorably shocked" regions10. After a permanent taste shock like the one proposed by Mundell, we can be closer to full employment without changing the nominal ER or the nominal prices if we tax region B sufficiently and give the proceeds to region A (or reduce tax in A). This will, under some reasonable assumptions about relative demands increase demand for good "a" and reduce demand for "b" at the initial relative prices. The tax and transfer policy will mitigate (although not completely eliminate) the initial regional imbalance.
We should note at this point that this interregional public insurance scheme does not even need to be "conscious": a proportional income tax even if accompanied by acyclical expenditures and transfers will automatically work as a tax/transfer system that helps to defend fixed ER parities. Even better, if (as we will see it is the case in the United States) the income tax is progressive and the transfer system is countercyclical, the fraction of the shocks insured by the fiscal system will be even larger.
In addition to this automatic insurance scheme, the Federal government could have other tools in order to be able to stabilize large nonstationary shocks such as the S&L crises in the United States or the German unification shock in Europe.
There is set of questions that immediately comes to mind:
(i) Couldn't the regional government stabilize output by running countercyclical deficits?
Regional governments (e.g. states within the United States) could try to stabilize regional income by themselves, running budget deficits during regional recessions and surpluses during booms, hut such a policy is likely to be much less effective than a federal arrangement. The problem with regional fiscal policy is that budget deficits have to be repaid by higher taxes or lower spending by the same region at some point in the future. Lower taxes paid by a region in recession are NOT matched in present value terms by higher future taxes paid by the same region, but rather by higher taxes paid by all regions in the federal area.
Another reason why state and regional governments Cannot really smooth income with countercyclical deficits is that, to the extent that factors of production are mobile, they may tend to remain in the state while taxes are low and leave when taxes increase. In other words, when regional governments run large deficits, firms and workers expect future tax increases. Of course that means that they will both tend to leave the region at the time of the tax increases, which will reduce the regional government tax base. As an example, let us imagine two countries: R (rich) and P (poor) who decide to create a federal union, Imagine that the rich country has an income of 1000 Ecus and the poor has an income of 500 Ecus. Suppose that they decide to pay an income tax of 10% to the central government.
The government will from then on give a transfer of lOOEcus a year to R and a transfer of SOEcus to P.
Note that in the first year there are no net transfers so this program is not designed to redistribute income from Rich to Poor.
Let us imagine that during the following year R suffers an adverse shock that reduces its income by l00Ecus while P sees its income increased by lOOEcus. The taxes paid to the Federal Government would still be 10% of income so R would pay 9OEcus and P 6OEcus. The transfers received from the central government would still be 100 and 5OEcus respectively. In effect, therefore, there would be a transfer from R to P by the amount of lOEcus. In other words, the Federal insurance scheme redistributes income from the country that suffers a favorable shock to the country that suffers an adverse shock, regardless of whether they happen to be Rich or Poort. In particular, it is independent of any other programs the federal governments may want to implement in order to reduce income inequality in the long run.
(iii) Couldn't private insurance markets do the same job?
In principle it is true that an auto worker in Detroit can write a contract with an economics professor in Massachusetts that insures eachother's wage against interregional shocks.
The problem with this argument is that, due to the practical difficulties in monitoring the wages from people living thousands of miles away, these type of contracts are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems that will in practice prevent them from existing12. It is shown in Sala-i-Kartin (1990) that state GDP and GNP behave very similarly over the periods for which both data are available (which includes the sample considered in the empirical section of this paper). If these contracts were important, the behavior of CDP and CNP would be very different.
The main goal of this paper is to find out empirically how important is this insurance role of the Federal Fiscal system across the United States'
regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In section 2 we highlight the empirical method used. In section 3 we describe the data.
In section 4 we report the main empirical results. In section 5 we quantify the importance of the empirical findings. The last section concludes.
(2) BASIC METHOD Our goal is to find by how many cents the disposable income of region i falls when there is a one dollar adverse shock to that region's income, and when the region belongs to a federal fiscal union. That is we want to see Our empirical strategy will be to estimate the two key elasticities and TR using United States state or regional data. The U.S. is a good laboratory because it consists of several economically distinct regions, linked together by a Federal Covernment and using an "irrevocably fixed ER system". We will divide the United States into nine census regions and try to estimate their federal tax and transfers elasticities (ie their TX and TR coefficients). We choose the nine census regions for two convenient reasons.
First, the size of the individual regions is then similar to the average size of a member of the European Community. Second, the division we choose is made by the Bureau of the Census to define census region. Thus, we cannot be accused of constructing the regions so as to fit the data better.
One could argue that an even more natural unit is the "state" because states have independent fiscal units (state governments). This is true but since the ultimate goal of this paper is to apply the results to the European community, the U.S. map with fifty states would look too different from the European one13. The Regions (as defined by the Bureau of the Census) are described in Table 1 .
To calculate the coefficients TX and TR' we will think about the following empirical implementation (which builds on Sala-i-Martin (1990) , Chapter 4):
where TAX refers to real tax revenue per capita, INCOME is real income per capita and TRANSFER is real value of transfers per capita. The TIME variable reflects upward/downward trends in relative taxes that are not explained by the relative variations in income. Long term movements in stuff which is not cyclically correlated with relative income.
The straight implementation of this two equations involves at least three problems. First, we may encounter simultaneity biases. Since higher taxes may depress regional economic activity, simple least squares estimates of equation (2.4) will have a downward bias, If we think of taxes as being lump sum, an increase in Federal taxes will reduce disposable income and, therefore, aggregate expenditure and output. We should mention here that this is true even if Ricardian Equivalence in the Barro (1974) sense holds.
This is true because people in region A may think that the higher tax rates they are paying now may be used to finance lower taxes in some other regions either now or in the future. Hence, their current human wealth falls with tax increases,
Of course we could think of this as being the "space dimension version" of Blanchard (1985): in his model, people think they can shift taxes to future yet unborn generations for which they do not really care about. Here agents think they can shift taxes to people of other regions for which they do not really care about either. The discount rates that
Blanchard interprets as probability of death can be interpreted here as the "probability of my taxes being paid by the people of some other state". If, more realistically, taxes are distortionary rather than lump sum, there will be additional negative effects on income of a rise in taxes, such as the disincentive of labor supply and investment.
The same type of arguments apply to transfers. Suppose that a decline in activity leads to a rise in transfers, through countercyclical spending programs such as unemployment insurance. If we try to estimate this negative relationship between economic activity and transfers, the estimated coefficient on economic activity will tend to be biased towards zero, since higher lump sum federal transfers will caeteris paribus tend to increase disposable income and consumption and therefore increase activity in the region.
We will try to solve this simultaneity problem by instrumental variables estimation.
The second problem we may encounter is that of endogenous U.S. budget deficits. One can argue that when the overall U.S. suffers a recession, the Federal Government runs a deficit (maybe because optimal tax rates are smooth).
If tax rates remain constant and transfers increase or remain constant, the federal government absorbs some of the initial shock. Barro (1979) finds that a one dollar shock to U.S. income generates an increase in the federal deficit of about 1.8 dollars. In order to make sure that we are not picking up these Federal Deficit effects, we want to see how the Federal taxes and transfers for a specific region change when the region's income changes by 1% relative to the rest of the nation. That is, we will estimate changes in regional taxes and transfers holding the overall US CNP, taxes and transfers constant. The two modified equations will therefore be the following:
+ where relative X refers to the ratio of state i's X to the overall U.S. value of X (where X is either tax revenue, transfers or personal income). The third empirical problem we have to deal with involves the error terms.
Even though we will start by estimating (2.4)' and (2.5)' with standard ordinary least squares, there is no a priori reason to assume that the error terms are homoscedastic or that they are uncorrelated across regions.
Therefore we will estimate the systems of equations allowing for correlation across equations and also allowing for the regional shocks to have different variances in different regions. A more comprehensive measure of "federal fiscal help" would include government purchases and project awards. We do not include them in our study for two reasons.
First, we did not find time series data on Federal purchases by state long enough to match our sample. The Tax Foundation collects these data since 1981. But the data do not exist before then.
Second, these data correspond to "contracts" not to actual expenditure: The final site of the supercollider will be Texas but this does not mean that all the money will be spent there. Scientists from Massachusetts, workers from Seattle and financial lizards from New York could very well benefit from the money awarded to Texas. Hence, for our purposes, these data are not that useful after all.
There are also other kinds of important transfer payments that are not included in our study up to this point. The federal government transfers involved in shutting down the failed savings and loan institutions would not be picked up the categories of transfer payments we are using, and yet the size of the transfers involved are very large.
As an illustration, as of mid-1988, there were 127 FSLIC-insured thrift institutions in Texas with a negative net worth (according to so-called GAAP accounting rules).
These institutions had a combined negative net worth of about $151 billion, or about 60 percent of the state's GNP! If Texas were an independent country, these bank failures would produce an extreme financial crisis that would cripple the Texas economy, a large decline in net wealth, and perhaps a significant external debt crisis, to the extent that deposits in the failed institutions were from outside of Texas. Instead, the crisis will produce, at much lower cost, an enormous transfer of income to Texas from the rest of the United States.
We will deflate the transfer data with the U.S. CPI and we will divide by population to calculate real federal transfer receipts per capita. Again we will divide the regional variable by the U.S. variable to get relative real federal transfer receipts per capita.
(4) ESTIMATION Instruments Regressions.
As mentioned earlier, the systems (2.4)' and (2.5)' are subject to simultaneity bias problems. To solve this potential problem we will try to There is no good reason to think that these aggregate shocks affect relative taxes and transfers through some channel other than relative income changes. So, in principle, they should be good instruments so long as they are correlated with initial income.
In Table 2 we show how well these proposed instruments correlate with relative income. We see that the regressions are highly successful for 8 out of the 9 regions. The exception is the Pacific region (PAC) with an adjusted R2 coefficient of about .35.
The other regions' R2 range from .65 in WNC to
.92 in ENC. We can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero for all regions at a 1% significance level (5% for PAC).
Some of the partial correlations In Table 2 The adjusted R2 is really low and none of the variables is significant.
We have tried to eliminate the smaller states (in particular Alaska and Hawaii) but the problem does not seem to come from any of them, but rather, from California.
If instead of relative income we regress relative taxes on relative unemployment rates, the coefficients for PAC are very similar to the other regions. This leads us to think that there could be some problem with the Californian income data. In the absence of further work, we should look at the Pacific results with some skepticism.
Relative Taxes Equations.
We can now proceed to estimate the relative tax and transfers equations (2.4)' and (2.5)'. The results for the tax equations are displayed in Table   3 . Each regression has been estimated by three different methods. Note that the coefficients for the relative income variable reported in Table 3 The coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 refer to the Instrumental Variables regressions. As we argued previously, the reason for using this method is the possible existence of simultaneity bias since higher relative tax rates may reduce relative regional income. Notice that the estimates of TX are very similar to ones reported for OLS regressions.
Finally in columns 5 and 6 we allow for the regional shocks to relative taxes u to be correlated across regions. In order to allow for that we estimate all the regions at the same time in a seemingly unrelated regression estimation system (S.U.R.). Again the estimates are not very different from the OLS ones, suggesting that the correlation of error terms across equations may not be that important.
We are now interested in testing the hypothesis of similar TX coefficients across regions. If, as we have conjectured, the elasticity coefficient TX reflects mostly the progressivity of the Federal Tax System, we should expect these coefficients to be constant across regions.
In the last six rows of The last three rows of Table 3 report the restricted Tx coefficients when we estimate the system of regions correcting for heteroscedasticity.
The weighting method employed gives more weight to the regions whose standard error of the regression (which is reported in We also estimated unconstrained weighted systems which allows us to test the hypothesis of equality of the TX coefficients across regions. We find that we cannot reject the hypothesis of regional equality at the 5% level in any of the three cases.
In summary, the estimated TX coefficient fluctuates around 1.35 and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal across regions.
This implies that, holding constant the aggregate US variables and adjusting for whatever factors affect the long-run movements in regional taxes, a 1 percent increase in a region's income increases its federal tax payments by 1.35 percent (statistically significantly larger than one).
Since there is no "intentional" reduction in tax rates when a region suffers an adverse shock, these findings just reflect the progressive nature of the US tax system.
A simple numerical example will further clarify what the numbers found mean. Consider an economy with an average tax rate of 20% (the average tax rate for our U.S. regions can be calculated to be around 20% from Table 5 ).
Suppose further that the average marginal tax rate is about 3Ø%l7 The TX coefficient for this economy (which the ratio of marginal to average tax rates) would be exactly 1.5. If the average marginal tax rate were 27%, the coefficient would be 1.35. Hence, our estimates are exactly in the ball park.
Relative Transfers Equations.
The picture for transfers (Table 4) The instrumental variables estimates reported in columns three and four are very similar to the OLS ones (which reflects the fact that we are estimating the relative income regressions in Table 2 with high precision). The restricted estimate is -.171 (s.e.-.0458) and can be rejected to be equal across regions at the 5% level (p-value-.000).
The results corresponding to the S.U.R. system are reported in columns 5
and 6 of Something similar happens with the IV regressions. Because the regions that had positive IV estimates had high standard errors, the weighted estimate is much higher than the unweighted one.
Finally, the results for the weighted SUR system are surprising. When we 18 estimated the unconstrained weighted system (not reported in the Table) we found that ALL the point estimates where negative and significant!.
The constrained estimate is -.226 (s.e.-.021) and the equality across regions cannot be rejected the 5% level (p-value-.l).
The better estimates of when we use a weighted S.U.R. system is probably due to the cross equation interaction of error terms being relatively important for the transfers equations.
Summarizing, the relative transfer coefficients for a system of nine U.S. regions display some instability if they are estimated giving equal weight to all regions. If we correct for heteroscedasticity, however, the coefficients are much more stable. The restricted unweighted numbers fluctuate around -.20 while the restricted weighted 's move around -.30.
The apparent instability of the TR coefficients is not surprising since, unlike taxes,the federal transfer system in the U.S. is not really set as an automatic reaction to personal income. In Table 6 we use the estimated coefficients from Tables 3 and 4 For instance, the restricted OLS numbers suggest that when a typical region in the U.S. suffers a one dollar adverse shock to its personal income, its average federal tax payments reduce by something between 33 and 35 cents (with a point estimate of 34 cents), its transfers increase by somewhere between 2 and 5 cents (with a point estimate of 3 cents) so that the disposable income falls by something between 59 and 65 cents (with a point estimate of 62 cents).
Notice that the results for ATX are very stable across Table 6 and they move between 34 and 37 cents to the dollar. This stability is due to the stability of the coefficients in Table 3 .
The results for ATR when we use the weighted estimates are a bit larger than the ones we get by using the The second half of Table 6 shows the A estimates for each of the nine regions. Notice that the estimated ATXs are extremely stable (except for the Pacific region). This again is due to our earlier finding that the TX coefficients are very stable across regions. The average tax response to a dollar shock is 34 cents. The estimated ATR fluctuate a lot more across regions, and therefore, so do the overall A's. The average transfer response to a dollar regional shock is 8 cents.
The corresponding average TOTAL response to a dollar regional shock is 58 cents. Notice that these results are not very far from the ones we got using the restricted estimates.
Taken as a whole, Table 6 suggests that when the average region suffers a one dollar adverse shock to its personal income, its federal tax payments are reduced by something between 33 and 37 cents, the transfers received from the federal government increase by somewhere between one and eight cents so the final disposable income falls by only 56 to 65 cents. Hence, the fraction of the initial shock that is absorbed by the federal fiscal system is between one third and one half. Most of the action comes from the tax side which probably reflects the progressive nature of the U.S. Federal Tax system.
(6) FINAL REMARKS.
We have argued that the U.S. can be viewed as a set of regions tied by an "irrevocably fixed ER'
and that this ER arrangement seems to work effectively. One of the reasons for this reasonably efficient system could be that the Fiscal Federalist system absorbs a substantial fraction of interregional shocks.
This reduces the need for nominal exchange rate realignments.
The existence of this Federal Fiscal system does not mean that there are no interregional adjustments to be made but, rather, that they are made without devaluations (or major pressures on the one-to-one fixed parities) and without extraordinary recessions.
We tried to estimate empirically the effects of such a Fiscal Federalist system and we found that a one dollar reduction in a region's per capita income triggered a decrease in federal taxes in the neighborhood of 34 cents and an increase in federal transfers of about 6 cents. The final reduction in disposable per capita income was, therefore, of only 60 cents. That is, between one third and one half of the original one dollar shock is absorbed by the Federal Government.
The much larger reaction of taxes than transfers to these regional imbalances reflects that the main mechanism at work is the progressive federal income tax system which in turn reflects that the stabilization process is automatic rather than discretionary. Our estimates do not include the large one time transfers that occur when there are large one time disasters (such as the S&L crises and the huge transfers from the U.S. to the few states involved). Hence, we are underestimating the role of the Federal Government as a partial insurer against regional shocks.
Some economists may want to argue that this regional insurance scheme provided by the federal government is one of the key reasons why the system of fixed exchange rates within the United States has survived without major problems. And this is a lesson to be learnt by the proponents of a unified .00
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Notes to Tables 3 and 4. OLS, IV and SUR correspond to the restricted OLS, Instrumental Variables and SUR systems. WOLS, WIV and WSUR correspond to the restricted weighted OLS, IV and SUR systems.
In parenthesis the A's associated with two standard deviations from the corresponding point estimate for fi.
The last few rows display the regional Aa corresponding to the unrestricted unweighted IV systems. The average is the unweighted average of all the As above.
Endnotes
See Hartland (1949) Lerner (1951) , Meade (1957) 2
The phrase "optimum currency area" was coined by Mundell in his classic (1961) paper.
John Stuart Mill. "Principles of political economy" vol. II, New York 1894, page. 176.
Although they did not use the phrase "optimum currency area" the concept of unique currency for regions with high labor mobility was already outlined by both Lerner (1951) and Meade (1957) .
From a Keynesian perspective therefore, the question of the appropriate exchange rate regime cannot really be separated from the debate question the importance and causes of nominal rigidities.
Of course the existence of nominal rigidities is at the very heart of the current macroeconomic debate.
See Blanchard (1990) for a survey.
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Other criteria mentioned in the literature are "the degree of openness"
(if marginal propensity to import, is very high, a small decrease in income in A and a small increase in B will restore equilibrium); the size of transaction costs (a unique currency reduces the transaction Costs and accounting costs); the extent of financial market integration (high capital mobility would facilitate borrowing and lending; of course that would not help with a permanent shift in preferences but it would certainly bevery important if the perturbations were temporary). We will not discuss them because we think that (at least in 1992) Europe will satisfy the two requirements Finally, some economists (Kenen 1969) , argue that open economies should have fixed ER only if they have a variety of exports. If an economy exports only one good, then a single shock may require a major real adjustment.
The debate over fixed versus flexible ER does not stop in the analysis of "what kind of shocks are you more likely to suffer". Some of the current debate stresses the "disciplinary" factors of having fixed ER (Giavazzi-Pagano (1988) , Giavazzi-Giovannini (1988) and Canzoneri-Henderson (1989) ). These researchers use a Barro-Gordon (1983) type of model to stress that the existence of fixed ER increases the anti-inflationary reputation of a single government and, therefore, reduces the real costs of an deflationary policy. For a criticism see Obstfeld (1988) .
8
The way this problem has been handled up to now in the EMS has been through devaluations. There have been 11 episodes of realignment in the 10 years of EMS existence (Giavazzi 1989 ). Kenen (1969) was the first to use this kind of argument. Hartland (1949) analyzes the implicit interregional transfers within the US. She looked at the treasury fund movements from industrialized to agricultural regions in response to the government policy of supporting farm prices in the 1930's. She concludes that "the most important determinant in the maintenance of regional balance of payments equilibria in this country has been the mobility of productive factors, especially that of capital". The argument is that the role of the government was not to carry out the actual transfers but to facilitate private capital movements. See also the Reply by Fels (1950) and Hartland (1950) .
10
The issue of convergence across U.S. states and European regions is studied in Sala-i-Martin (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a and b) . Sala-i-Martin (1990) also studies the role of the U.S. Federal Government in promoting regional convergence.
12
See Eichengreen (1991) for a discussion of this topic.
13 An even better division would be the "Federal Reserve District" one, which involves 12 Federal Reserve Districts. The tax and transfers coefficients we estimate here, however, are not sensitive to the choice of region. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991) use 12 Federal Reserve regions in a paper that studies the interplay between money and output in a system of irrevocably fixed exchanges rates.
14
The missing proportion is a little larger for the beginning of the sample: about 25%. The income tax receipts have remained more or less constant over the sample.
All the systems allow for each region to have its own constant and time trend.
16
The Pacific region is once again an exception with TX•535 (s.e.-3315).
Its large standard error, however, implies (as we will see in a second) that its OLS estimate is not significantly different from the rest since we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of across regions.
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The average marginal tax rate in the United States has fluctuated over the sample. It was 27% in 1970 and progressively increased until it reached a maximum of 38% in 1981. The Reagan tax cuts brought it back down to 34% by 1985. See Barro (1990) for a discussion of these numbers.
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The results where the following NENG--.329 (s.e.-.052), 
